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WHEN INSTITUTIONS FAIL: THE CASE OF
UNDERAGE MARRIAGE IN INDIA
Michele Goodwin*
INTRODUCTION
When do we know that the rule of law has failed or been corrupted?
Who can we point to as corrupting legal order or the rule of law when
most litigating parties appear to be "one-shotters"? In his seminal
work, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, Professor Marc Galanter points to "one-shotters" as
the vulnerable, unable to quickly master, and more importantly con-
quer, sophisticated legal labyrinths made less an enigma to "repeat
players"-the legal elites.' In India, the lines that divide the elite
from the less sophisticated, or the repeat players from the one-shot-
ters, are as thick as the social customs that once divided the nation
into castes. However, the lines separating individual one-shotters may
be more ambiguous and less distinct, as even Galanter acknowledged.
In India, as in the Western world, the subject of women's rights has
been deeply contested over time. To be sure, the law functions as a
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vehicle to uplift women, erecting rights where previously none existed,
including granting the right to vote,2 creating entitlements to fair
wages, 3 establishing just labor practices, 4 and accommodating family
planning in the work place,5 to name a few. Historically, however, law
has also been used as a tool to undercut the basic human rights of
women and diminish their status in society. Examples of the legal
subordination of women abound throughout both the West and the
East. Social and political mechanisms like coverture, which was bor-
rowed from French law and adopted in English and early American
common law, provide a potent example. 6 Coverture rules denied
property rights to married women and established them as property
owned by their husbands and fathers.7 This complicated legacy can-
not be denied, even as we mark significant progress on the rights and
advancements of women who are aided by the rule of law.
In other words, gender oppression can, and too frequently does, ex-
ist alongside gender equality. Social status, class, and tribal affiliation
affect the lives and opportunities of women differently in any given
society. The experiences of elites in society, for example, whether
men or women, can and will differ vastly from those whose lives are
consumed by poverty, poor healthcare, and hunger. One cannot be
naive to these realities; in fact, for the rule of law to be a meaningful
tool, its reach must extend beyond the elite-those who are educated,
privileged, and politically leveraged.
It is with this in mind that this Article evaluates the usefulness,
promise, and impact of the rule of law on young women in India. In-
deed, the rule of law has come under attack by scholars who have
suggested that it is overly optimistic, if not misleading, as a tool for
achieving gender equality.8 The complaint is that the rule of law can
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
4. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006) (providing workers,
both male and female, a variety of rights, such as forming labor unions, engaging in collective
bargaining, and going on strike).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) (stating that one purpose of the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993 is "to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families").
6. See Claudia Zaher, When a Woman's Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status: A Re-
search Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW LIaR. J. 459 (2002) (providing
an overview and compilation of a variety of sources discussing the history and current status of
the common law coverture doctrine).
7. See id. at 459-60 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442) (noting that,
under the doctrine of coverture, the "legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage").
8. See, e.g., Moni Pizani, Foreword to UNITED NATIONS Errrv FOR GENDER EQUALrTY AND
THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN, Do OUR LAWS PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY?, at i (3d ed.
2012), available at http://cedaw-seasia.org/docs/FINALCEDAWHandbook.pdf ("Many Gov-
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mask inequality in society.9 Socio-legal scholars remind us that the
law as written is meaningless if not enforced. 10 Granting women the
right to vote while prohibiting or limiting access to voting is a provoc-
ative example of institutional failure and illustrates how the law must
live beyond legislation or text.
This Article casts a narrow net, examining institutional failure in the
protection of children. Specifically, the research project from which
this Article developed studied the prevalence of young women forced
or trafficked into domestic partnerships in India, South Africa, and the
Philippines. Each country has a well-known, distinct treatment of
child brides both within the law and their individual societies." This
Article narrows that grouping even further and examines the ways in
which young women's life choices and capacities become diminished
through arranged marriages in India, which often contravene local
legislation, but are not usually overturned by local courts after nup-
tials are final. Indeed, judges engage in marital ceremonies as key
players or collaborators in law's failure-they often perform the nup-
tials. Advocacy organizations estimate that the cases capturing inter-
national attention, such as ten-year-old girls successfully winning
divorces against older husbands, represent only a fraction of forced
child marriages. 12
Despite the enactment of laws prohibiting underage matrimony in
India, an incredibly high incidence of child marriage persists, exposing
the law's weakness or failure. In India, for example, 43% of all girls
are forced into marriage before the age of eighteen, 13 which is the
ernments believe that gender-neutral laws benefit women and men equally, while in fact-due to
deeply rooted structural, institutional, social, and cultural barriers for women-the opposite is
often true. Failure to consider and address gender differences in laws perpetuates gender ine-
quality.") (emphasis added).
9. See CATHERINE R. ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE MOBILIZATION OF
THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 13 (2010) ("[Rlelying on rights may merely reinforce
and legitimize a legal system that masks inequality." (citation omitted)).
10. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness
and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 954 (2007) ("Judgments are handed down,
but they frequently are not in fact enforced. Litigation thus will not produce lasting social conse-
quences for those who choose the legal path.").
11. The Girls Not Brides partnership monitors child marriages internationally, including
within the countries studied through my project. See Where Does It Happen?, GIRLS NOT
BRIDES: THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP TO END CHILD MARRIAGE, http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/
where-does-it-happen (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). The organization confirms the global reach of
child marriages and the many ways in which girls are harmed by these arrangements. See id.
12. See generally NuJooD ALl wiTH DELPHINE MINOUI, I AM NUJOOD, AGE 10 AND DI-
VORCED (Linda Coverdale trans., 2010) (detailing the story of Nujood Ali, a ten-year-old girl
from Yemen who successfully divorced her husband in April 2008).
13. UNICEF Information Sheet: Child Marriage, UNICEF 1 (2011), http://www.unicef.org/in-
dia/ChildMarriageFact-SheetNov20llfinal.pdf [hereinafter Child Marriage].
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legal age of marriage.1 4 In one northern state, the rate of women
forced into underage marriage is almost 70%. 15 These marriages ex-
tend deeply rooted cultural norms that represent more than the sym-
bolic joining of households; they perpetuate and further entrench a
complex system of gender subordination that includes intra-gender
slavery and abuse, 16 denial of education, 17 domestic violence, 8 mari-
tal rape, 19 teenage pregnancy,20 maternal and child mortality, 21 the
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases (including HIV and
AIDS),22 and dowry (another illegal practice that persists in the
shadows of law). 23
In India, child-bride trafficking often operates under the trained ra-
dars of human rights organizations, both within and outside the coun-
try. For example, organizations that tend to advocate against
domestic violence toward women often view women and not girls as
the beneficiaries of their advocacy. Thus, girls forced into underage
marriages occupy a distinct cohort that too often slips through the
cracks of advocacy organizations and the legal regimes of Western
countries interested in providing political guidance and aid to devel-
oping nations. 24
When the U.S. Department of State attacks international traffick-
ing, it does so with a different "victim" cohort in mind.25 The federal
14. Id. at 3.
15. Data from 2007 to 2008 illustrate that 68.2% of women between the age of twenty and
twenty-four in Bihar were married before the age of eighteen. Id. at 1.
16. Id. at 1-2.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1.
19. Cf Child Marriage, supra note 13, at 1-2 (noting that young girls lack the "negotiation
skills and experience" that would allow them greater control over their sexual relations).
20. See id. at 1.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2.
24. See, e.g., MAGGIE BANGSER, USAID, 'FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS'-ADOLESCENT
GIRLS IN TANZANIA: INSIGHTS FROM MTWARA 3 (2010), available at http://www.svri.org/adol.pdf
("[G]irls continue to 'fall through the cracks' of most development policies and programs
worldwide.").
25. In a recent speech at Dublin City University, then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton offered a promising turn in U.S. Department of State policy, pledging that the United
States will begin monitoring underage marriages in developing nations, beginning in 2013. See
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, U.S. Dep't State, Frontlines and Frontiers: Making
Human Rights a Human Reality (Dec. 6, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/sec-
retary/rm/2012/12/201618.htm). The potential scope of U.S. efforts in this domain remains unar-
ticulated and may depend upon who succeeds Secretary Clinton as the U.S. Secretary of State.
In the meantime, data collection and monitoring may help to convince U.S. lawmakers that
underage marriage impacts the lives of girls in developing nations and pressure nations to report
the practice. However, eradicating child marriage will demand more. In fact, collecting data is
[Vol. 62:357
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approach has been to group all "sex work" into sex trafficking while
leaving out underage marriage-the first step in sex work for many
underage brides. 26
According to the Tahirih Justice Center, a prominent legal defense
organization, "the United States ... lags far behind-and until now,
has done little to recognize or address the problem of forced marriage.
Domestically, there are very few laws and policies specifically to help
forced marriage victims, leaving young women (and some men) in cri-
sis with few resources and options."'27 These tensions are further com-
plicated by the West's post-colonial, "hands-off" approach to
challenging custom or traditional norms in developing nations, selec-
tively aiding and intervening among nations during conflict.
2 8
In fact, uncertainty persists among domestic law enforcement as to
when and how to intervene when sexually violent practices emigrate
along with their victims into the United States.29 In 2011, the Tahirih
Justice Center conducted a national survey of more than 500 legal,
medical, social service, educational, and religious agencies, which
found that 67% of survey respondents believe cases of forced mar-
riage occur among the populations they serve in the United States.
30
The immigrant victims, however, remain significantly underserved, as
only 16% of respondent agencies claimed to be equipped to help the
victims they encounter.31
Chris Boughey, the lead officer who investigated the death of Noor
Almaleki (a young woman murdered by her father for becoming "too
westernized") explained to reporters, "We don't have the mechanisms
not the challenge; enforcing states' laws that penalize the practice is the more challenging
problem.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). From a practical standpoint, it would be
difficult to prosecute a person for the sex trafficking of a spouse. See id.
27. TAHIRIH JUSTICE CENTER, FORCED MARRIAGE IN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS 1 (2011), available at http://www.tahirih.org/
site/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/REPORT-Tahirih-Survey-on-Forced-Marriage-in-Immigrant-
Communities-in-the-United-States-September-20114.pdf.
28. See Linda Burstyn, Female Circumcision Comes to America, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct.
1995, at 28.
29. Underage marriage occurs as "tradition" in many developing countries, including India.
In some countries the practice is confined to discrete ethnic minorities, while in others, the prac-
tice extends beyond tribal affiliations and ethnic divides. The United States and other Western
nations choose not to leverage sanctions against India even though underage marriages occur
with some frequency, often involving sexual violation and rape, as well as elements of trafficking.
This Article does not make a policy argument about that strategy (the use of sanctions) to re-
duce the incidences of child marriage. The point here is that "tradition" can be strategically
leveraged to maintain draconian practices in developing nations, even while economic and politi-
cal partnerships are formed with the West that urge social transformation. See id.
30. See TAHIRIH JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 27, at 4-5.
31. Id. at 3.
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in place here in the U.S. to take care of these girls."' 32 Boughey, who
serves as an investigator at Arizona's Peoria Police Department, la-
ments his department's limitations: "What do we do with a teenager
runaway? Ninety-nine percent of the time, we take her home. But
some of these [immigrant] girls end up getting killed. '33 Advocacy
organizations notice the law enforcement gaps:
When Tahirih began to work on these cases, we were struck by how
few resources and legal options exist in the United States to assist
individuals facing forced marriages, as well as how little awareness
or understanding there is nationwide about the unique dynamics
and challenges in forced marriage situations.34
Suffering, then, are girls.
Linda Burstyn underscores this point in a particularly chilling ac-
count of female genital mutilation and Western passivity, chronicled in
the Atlantic Monthly.35 She noted:
Even though the details of some of the extreme yet common forms
of the practice are as horrifying to most Americans as Nazi human
experimentation or brutal child abuse, documentation is hard to
come by, and resistance to infringing upon the traditions and mores
of another culture is difficult to overcome.36
Catherine Hogan, founder of the Washington Metropolitan Alliance
Against Ritualistic FGM, framed the issue along the lines of race:
When you wrap this issue in the cloth of culture, you just can't see
what's inside. This is a clear case of child abuse. It's a form of re-
verse racism not to protect these girls from barbarous practices that
rob them for a lifetime of their God-given right to an intact body. 37
Jeffrey Reitz, a professor at the University of Toronto, concurs, noting
that when the matter involves domestic violence and even murder,
"[i]f you label it an honor killing, the tendency is to say, 'Oh, what a
terrible culture that is,' and the problem (of domestic violence) stems
across cultural groups. '38
Forced underage marriages pose significant public health problems,
in addition to human rights and criminal law complications. In India,
judges informed me that they attempt to mitigate harms associated
32. Julia Dahl, "Honor Killing" Under Growing Scrutiny in the U.S., CBS NEWS: CRIMESIDER
(Apr. 4, 2012, 3:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57409395-504083/honor-kill-
ing-under-growing-scrutiny-in-the-u.s.
33. Id.
34. See TAHIRIH JUSTICE CENTER, supra note 27, at 2.
35. See Burstyn, supra note 28.
36. Id.
37. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Christopher Santarelli, Honor Killings Prompt Debate in Canada on Assimilating Immi-
grants, BLAZE (Dec. 25, 2011, 5:15 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2011/12/25/honor-kill-
ings-prompt-debate-in-canada-on-assimilating-immigrants (internal quotation marks omitted).
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with forced marriage by encouraging girls to apply for divorce after
reaching the age of puberty. Rather than incentivizing young women
to come forward, however, such posturing from the bench may serve
as a disincentive. The likelihood (and safety) of girls escaping difficult
domestic living arrangements to petition courts for divorce after sev-
eral years of marriage, possibly with children, is doubtful. What con-
nects these stories are the ways in which courts often fail to address
the underlying legal and social reality: young girls are bartered and
sold into marriages, frequently in violation of the law and interna-
tional treaties.
In Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead, Marc Galanter observed,
"Most analyses of the legal system start at the rules end and work
down through institutional facilities to see what effect the rules have
on the parties. '' 39 Like Galanter's seminal article, this project reor-
ders that hierarchy and considers the entrenched problem of child
marriage from the ground up. In other words, this project invites a
reflection on law's order by visiting the players and studying how their
statuses function to inscribe "the way the system works."'40 India's
underage-marriage markets reveal the autonomous, complex, and du-
plicitous roles of government. On the one hand, rule development is
shaped by exogenous forces and demands. Government officials,
however, too frequently perceive law or legislation as "enough.
'41
That is, they perceive rule development as initiating, concluding, and
satisfying socio-legal obligations.
On the other hand, courts function with significant independence
and autonomy, habitually deferring as much to the "laws" of custom,
as they do legislative law or judicial common law.42 Often, especially
in matters of civil or human rights, the law of custom conflicts with
newly developed legislative principles and rules. 43 This is particularly
the case in underage marriage, but the theory could be applied to
other matters of family law including infanticide, sex selection, domes-
tic violence, and marital rape.44 I have chosen underage marriage be-
39. Galanter, supra note 1, at 97.
40. Id.
41. See, ALBISTON, supra note 9, at 13; Lobel, supra note 10, at 954; Pizani, supra note 8, at i.
42. Interview with Pancham Lal, Sec'y to Parliament Affairs, State of Bihar, in Bihar, India
(Feb. 18, 2011).
43. See INT'L PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED'N, ENDING CHILD MARRIAGE: A GUIDE FOR
GLOBAL POLICY ACTION 2 (2006), available at http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib-pubfile/662_file
nameendchildmarriage.pdf ("Most countries have laws on the minimum age of marriage, but
they are largely ineffective, not enforced or operate alongside customary and religious laws.").
44. UNITED NATIONS, 15 YEARS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON VIO-
LENCE AGAINST WOMEN, ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 4-5 (2009), available at http://www.
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cause it is a particularly potent example of courts' deference to
traditional norms and values. 45
Who benefits, then, from the courts' adherence to custom over leg-
islative law? Repeat players, such as marriage brokers 46 and
polygamists, and one-shotters-groomsmen intending to marry under-
age girls and families committed to forcing their daughters into mar-
riages-benefit from judicial flexibility or passivity. Thus, whether
repeat players or one-shotters, "tradition" can maximize opportunities
to influence judicial decision making, in addition to undermining one-
shotters who appeal to the rule of law.
Clearly then, not all repeat players fit the traditional definition of
"haves," nor can all one-shotters be categorized as "have-nots," as de-
fined by Galanter's iconic work. 47 Indeed, rural poverty may, at first
glimpse, rule Galanter's framework inapplicable; poverty pervades
northern, rural Indian states. Local law is often tribal law, enforced
by village chiefs. Wealth in some of these communities can be defined
by owning a single cow or goat; every resource is used, including dung
to create patties for which women use as fuel for heating and cooking.
Children, cows, and other animals bathe and drink from the same
water; everyone is malnourished-the children, animals, and their
mothers. In this space of abject poverty, one could easily conclude
that no "haves" exist. Status, however, may be difficult to discern
with Western eyes, which view all small, crowded huts with bare, dirt
floors as indistinguishable from one another.
On close inspection, however, the defining features that distinguish
the "haves". from the "have-nots" tumble to the fore. Power matters
throughout India, and large rural states are no exception. Power, sta-
tus, and the means to regenerate and to create wealth are determined
by gender.48 Thus, sex also matters.49 In other words, that which is
ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/15YearReviewofVAWMandate.pdf (discussing custom's
role in enforcing various forms of violence against women and girls).
45. See Interview with Pancham Lal, supra note 42.
46. India's marriage market drives a significant portion of the economy at 250 billion Indian
rupies per year. The business is lucrative and an evolving part of the economic and social fabric
of the nation. See Ira Trivedi, The (New) Business of Marriage, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Oct. 28,
2011), http://www.hindustantimes.com/Entertainment/Luxury/The-new-business-of-marriage/Ar-
ticlel-762156.aspx.
47. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 97-98.
48. "'Gender' refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes
that a given society considers appropriate for men and women." See What Do We Mean by
"Sex" and "Gender"?, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/gender/whatisgender/en (last
visited Feb. 7, 2013).
49. "'Sex' refers to the biological and physiological characteristics that define men and
women." Id.
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true in most of India-men matter-is amplified in rural communities.
A premium is placed on male births and, to an equal degree, punish-
ment and disdain accompanies the births of girls.50 To explain further,
birthing sons (and manhood itself) inculcates a higher order status or
privilege, which carries weight not only in the home, but also within
the judicial system in local courts.
Thus, even within a deeply entrenched society of male dominance,
power, and control, the status of women varies in rural communities;
some women are "haves" in rural villages and wield their power with
brutal force against their "have-not" daughters-in-law. Because fluid-
ity exists within these categories, the ways in which intrafamilial ar-
rangements and relationships of competing parties (mothers-in-law
versus daughters-in-law, grooms versus brides, brides versus their par-
ents, and all parties versus marriage brokers) clearly indicate what ad-
vantages are thereby reinforced and augmented. According to
Galanter, "This position of advantage is one of the ways in which a
legal system formally neutral as between 'haves' and 'have-nots' may
perpetuate and augment the advantages of the former.
51
This Article takes up the case of child marriage in India to demon-
strate why the "haves" come out ahead in India's marriage markets.
To do so, it exposes the descriptive gaps that lead to normative chal-
lenges in the implementation and enforcement of India's marriage
laws: the Hindu Marriage Act 52 and the Prohibition of Child Marriage
Act.5 3 As a descriptive matter, India's marriage law system, governed
primarily by the Hindu Marriage Act,54 is replete with competing
laws, including the Muslim Marriage Act,55 the Indian Christian Mar-
riage Act,56 the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act,57 the Special Mar-
riage Act,58 and the Foreign Marriage Act.59 Further yet, new
marriage acts are frequently proposed to disentangle the overlapping
50. See O.P. Sharma & Carl Haub, Sex Ratio at Birth Begins to Improve in India, POPULATION
REFERENCE BUREAU (Aug. 2008), http://www.prb.org/Articles/2008/indiasexratio.aspx?p=l,&p
=1.
51. Galanter, supra note 1, at 103-04.
52. This Article refers to the controlling law, the Hindu Marriage Act, which prohibits under-
age marriage, establishing eligibility at twenty-one for males and eighteen for females. See The
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, No. 25, Acts of Parliament, 1955 (India), amended by The Prohibi-
tion of Child Marriage Act, 2006, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, 2007 (India).
53. See The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, 2007 (India).
54. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, No. 25, Acts of Parliament, 1955 (India).
55. Muslim Marriage Act, 1957, No. 53, Acts of Parliament, 1957 (India).
56. Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 1872.
57. Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, No. 3, Acts of Parliament, 1936 (India).
58. The Special Marriage Act, 1954, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1954 (India).
59. Foreign Marriage Act, 1969, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1969 (India).
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layers of conflict and inconsistency between the various laws. For ex-
ample, in 2008, the Law Commission of India proposed the "Laws of
Civil Marriages in India-A Proposal to Resolve Certain Conflicts,"
noting that
[f]or the Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas and Sikhs marrying within these
four communities the Special Marriage Act, 1954 is an alternative to
the Hindu Marriage Act. The Muslims too have choice between
their uncodified personal law and the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
But the issue of availability of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 for a
marriage, both parties to which are Christians, remains
unresolved. 60
In other words, there is no unifying law pertaining to religious mar-
riages in India.61 Some marriages in India require marriage licenses,
while others do not; some marriage laws permit unions between cous-
ins and others do not.62 Some traditional norms govern, seemingly
trumping federal law, and some traditional norms are now ensconced
in law and conflict with federal law, particularly as they relate to mar-
riage. 63 These descriptive gaps raise questions about federalism and
the use of local or state actors-from community chiefs, clergy, match-
makers, and marriage brokers to judges-to interpret and implement
federal law.
As a normative matter, implementing "marriage law" in India
presents problems and questions for the federal government. These
questions range from the basic (How are local authorities to be kept
accountable? Should local authorities have less discretion?), to the
more nuanced (How should cooperation and collaboration be
achieved? What should be done when religion and federal law col-
lide? Do the multiple marriage laws imply that India's Congress as-
sents to the idea that child marriage should also be mutually governed
by federal as well as religious law?).
Parts II and III of this Article provide a conspectus, framing the
descriptive and empirical components of the project. Part II briefly
orients my two years of intermittent field research in India by detail-
ing its scope, approach, and methodology. Part III then turns to the
scope of India's child marriage problem. Part IV uses India's mar-
60. LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, Gov'T OF INDIA, LAWS OF CIVIL MARRIAGES IN INDIA-A PRO-
POSAL TO RESOLVE CERTAIN CONFLICTS 6 (2008), available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.
in/reports/report212.pdf.
61. Id. at 14 (proposing that all inter-religious marriages be conducted only under the Special
Marriage Act).
62. Id. at 17-20; see also Marriage Procedures in India for NRI's, PlO's or Foreigners,
MADAAN & Co., http://www.madaan.com/marriage.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
63. See LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, supra note 60.
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riage law to explore normative questions. Part V explains why the
impact of institutional arrangements perverts the delivery of justice to
girls forced into underage marriage. It demonstrates that providing
girls with more law does not reduce inequality or create the pathways
for equal opportunity or status enhancement. Part VI provides a
conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND, SCOPE, AND FUNCTION OF THIS RESEARCH
This project began as an expanded inquiry into sex trafficking.
Most notably, marriage is often removed from the descriptive and the-
oretical accounts of human and sex trafficking, despite substantial evi-
dence that financial exchanges pervade the formation of modern
marriages in many countries, including India. Upon inspection, a
probing analysis has not been offered for this gap.
FIGURE 1: SIXTEEN-YEAR-OLD BRIDE AND MEN OF THE VILLAGE
6 4
A. Background
India abolished dowry with the Dowry Prohibition Act.65 Yet,
dowry remains an important part of contemporary marriage in India.
Promoting and protecting family property and wealth are competing
and overlapping interests in many Indian marriages. Financial or
64. This photograph was taken by the author.
65. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, No. 28, Acts of Parliament, 1961 (India). Dowry is a
gift or money provided by the wife's family to the husband's family.
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"gift" exchanges are often explicit and the consequences for reneging
on dowry promises can be severe, including the battery and death of a
bride. In an interview, Judge Komal Ram informed me that "dowry
has become an accepted evil in society. '66 Marriage brokers as well as
matchmakers figure into these sophisticated marriage markets. Finan-
cial exchanges pervade many aspects of Indian marriages, often with-
out the consent of the bride.
Thus, one element of this project emerged from my theory that
marriages can and do serve as minor sex-trafficking networks, which
vary from the somewhat innocuous, involving adults deferring to pa-
rental influence over their marriages, to the extreme, including under-
age girls being forced into marriages with older men. Figure 1
captures the image of a lone sixteen-year-old bride, soon to marry her
second husband after the first had died.
Coinciding, then, with my interests and prior works expanding on
how human markets form to satisfy "intimacy" needs67-be it organs
for survival,68 surrogates to facilitate exogenous gestation,69 or babies
to satisfy the need to parent7 0-is the desire to flesh out "on-the-
ground" marriage arrangements in India involving underage children,
especially girls.
Thus began the Indian Marriage Market project. As it turns out,
marriages follow some of the same conditions and terms economists
associate with traditional markets, including scarcity, supply, cost, and
demand. Yet, underage-marriage markets are also a space for which
traditional economic theory and the nomenclature of economics fail to
capture the full scope of the problem.
This Article addresses a portion of that research, focusing on the
normative question: Why does underage marriage persist despite law's
prohibitions or, in fitting with this Symposium, under what conditions
does law fail? -
66. Interview with Komal Ram, Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, in Bihar, India (Feb. 19,
2011).
67. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Private Ordering and Intimate Spaces: Why the Ability to Ne-
gotiate is Non-Negotiable, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1367, 1367-69 (2007) (book review).
68. See MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS
(2006).
69. See generally BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES
(Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010) (discussing the increasing use of market-like processes in
reproduction, including surrogacy) [hereinafter BABY MARKETS].
70. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Price and Pretense in the Baby Market, in BABY MARKETS, supra
note 69, at 41, 44 ("For some prospective parents, the desire for a family is so strong that they
will stop at virtually nothing to procure a child ....").
[Vol. 62:357
WHEN INSTITUTIONS FAIL
B. Scope, Approach, and Methodology
The project engaged in on-the-ground fieldwork in Delhi; Mumbai;
Pune; Patna; Varanasi; Trivandrum; the outer, rural reaches of Bihar;
Uttar Pradesh; and wrapped up in Kerala. 71 Prior descriptive ac-
counts of some of the rural communities in India72 could not properly
place in context the human deprivation, banditry, corruption, and
poverty on full display throughout villages: water buffalo and cows
sharing the road, men defecating on the sides of paved, then gravel,
then dust roads.
In many ways, the rural villagers in Bihar and Rajasthan are the
forgotten or the undiscovered among the Indian elite. One female
Indian lawyer from Mumbai informed me that prior to seeing my
photos from Bihar, she was unaware of the conditions in that state.
Indeed, the conditions in rural India are so strikingly dissimilar to the
norms in India's crowded cities that their realities are but fiction or
dystopia to others.
Included in the project was a wide-ranging review of law, policies,
and guidelines relating to child marriage. Anchoring the research
were field interviews with judges, police officers, nongovernmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), the chief of UNICEF's children's division in In-
dia, parents, grooms, and brides. Indeed, what makes this project
unique is its conversations with local community members. For exam-
ple, a recent study commissioned by UNICEF to study child marriage
in India included interviews with "key officials," but not on-the-
ground actors who facilitated the marriages, or those coerced or
forced into the arrangements. 73 Nevertheless, UNICEF, the most sig-
nificant presence actively working to eliminate child marriage, pro-
vided consistent and on-going support for this project.
This research was facilitated over two years with two intensive stays
in India, separated by a one-year period. An extensive literature re-
view was conducted prior to the launch of the project.74 Indeed, it
became clear from the literature review that, despite the persistent
problem of child marriage, few doctrinal or theoretical accounts have
been offered to explain this problem as a failure of law or a failure of
federalism. Materials gathered during interviews brought to the fore a
few noticeable gaps, including federal investment in anti-child mar-
71. See infra Figure 2.
72. See supra Part I.
73. See UNICEF, DESK REVIEW OF CHILD MARRIAGE 2 (2011), available at http://www.khub
marriagel8.orgsites/default/files/18.pdf.
74. Id. at 1. This pre-field research period included the arduous process of obtaining approval
from the Institutional Review Board.
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riage literature and posters. Interestingly, with India's astoundingly
high illiteracy rates in the communities with the highest number of
child marriages, such a system does not offer reliable protection.
When this matter was brought to a chief legal officer at the National
Commission for Women, he replied that "in India, education is com-
pulsory up to [the] age of fourteen. 75
TABLE 1: FIELD VISITS
Participants
Ministry of Health &
Family Welfare
National Commission
for Women
International NGOs
Member of
Parliament
Lawyers
Lawyers
Marriage Parties
Judges
NGOs
NGOs
Police
Judges
Lawyers
Magistrate
Marriage Parties
Marriage Parties
Marriage Parties
Location
Delhi
Delhi
Delhi
Bihar
Delhi
Mumbai
Mumbai
Bihar
Trivandrum
Delhi
Bihar
Bikramganj
Bikramganj
Patna
Bikramganj
Pune
Mumbai
Federal/State/District
Federal/Central
Federal/Central
Federal/Central
Federal/Central
Federal/Central
State
State
State
State
State
State
District
District
District
District
District
District
75. Interview with S.C. Kaushik, Senior Research Officer, Nat'l Comm'n of Women, in Delhi,
India (Feb. 22, 2012).
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FIGURE 2: POLITICAL MAP OF INDIA7 6
76. TRAVEL INDIA GUIDE: POLITICAL MAP OF INDIA, http://www.travelindia-guide.com/maps/
political map.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
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III. CHILD MARRIAGE: POVERTY, ILLITERACY,
AND JUDICIAL ABROGATION
This project led me into what many describe as the most destitute
state in India: Bihar. The social conditions are so abysmal in its rural
areas that even the most revered legal institutions and government
buildings mire in decades-thick grime and filth. The stench emanating
from the buildings, nearly indiscernible from that outdoors, goes un-
noticed because it is so much a part of life in this community. Plumb-
ing in these buildings often does not work and has not for years.
Buckets serve as makeshift latrines in even the senior judge's cham-
ber. According to a recent survey, in rural communities like Bihar
and Jharkhand, as few as 4.9% of the population used piped drinking
water, less than 23% had electricity, and less than 6% had toilets.77
It is in the dusty villages of Bihar, the state most notorious for child
marriage, but also known for illiteracy, banditry, theft, kidnappings,
and poverty, that tourists and Indians are warned not to travel into its
inner caverns or take the train.78 As one commentator recently ob-
served, "Train travel in Bihar has been always fraught with dangers
with aggressive ticketless travelers and train robbers looting passen-
gers. Burning down trains is just the latest threat. '79 In Bihar, there is
little respect for governmental authority, and officials seem somewhat
aware of this. In an interview with the British Broadcasting Company
(BBC), a bank official explained the risk of travel in Bihar: "Anything
can happen to you-you could be robbed, drugged, shot for a seat,
thrown out of the coach for refusing a bribe to the police, or have your
coach burnt down by an angry mob."'80 The superintendent of railway
police confirmed this concern, noting that each day a handful of trav-
elers are drugged and robbed on the trains.81 It is with this backdrop
that one is introduced to the villages in this vast state and its compet-
ing legal regimes, that is, the law of custom versus federal law.
Indeed, for the common reader, life in this region may be difficult
to comprehend and this description may seem like an exaggeration.
Yet, a picture should be offered to ground this Article and better con-
textualize why judges who become complicit in attending, performing,
77. See INT'L INST. POPULATION Sci., DIST. LEVEL HOUSEHOLD AND FACILITY SURVEY:
JHARKHAND FACT SHEET (2007-2008) [hereinafter JHARKHAND FACT SHEET], available at
http://www.jsk.gov.in/dlhs3/Jharkhand.pdf.
78. See Amarnath Tewary, Why People Burn Trains in Bihar, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/south asia/8213488.stm (last updated Aug. 24, 2009).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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and certifying child marriages are passive about challenging or over-
ruling custom. Understanding the conditions of their professional and
living spaces (apartments are supplied to judges and the state man-
dates their habitation in the dwellings-even those that are cramped,
unsanitary, and without adequate running water) does not fully ex-
plain why judges disregard the rule of law by certifying child mar-
riages; judges are imbedded literally and figuratively in these
communities. Yet, they are not of the communities, and the villagers
(and judges) understand this. However, this brief descriptive account
may illume why judges seem eager to rotate on to a new state, require
police and security escorts when they travel into the villages, and seem
so disenchanted with the power of federal law to make any inroads to
compete against local tradition. The problem manifests as a circuitous
enigma; local norms are unlikely to change if the interpreters and im-
plementers of federal policy neglect their duties and defer their au-
thority. In several interviews, judges appeared to believe that
upholding federal anti-child marriage laws was a useless task.
A. Child Marriage: Conflicting Law
Efforts to protect children from underage marriage in India date
back nearly a century to the passage of the Child Marriage Restraint
Act of 1929.82 Twenty-six years later, the Hindu Marriage Act
(HMA)8 3 legislatively reaffirmed this priority. One goal in clarifying
the minimal age of marriage in India was to prevent a cyclical problem
that pervaded states throughout the country: intergenerational
preteen and teen pregnancy. Not terribly uncommon, then, is grand-
parentage occurring in the late twenties and early thirties.
The HMA prohibits the marriage of men and women under ages
twenty-one and eighteen respectively, and describes other forbidden
marital arrangements, including marrying the insane, epileptic, and
currently betrothed.8 4 The HMA functions as India's guiding legisla-
tion on marriage, despite numerous overlapping and confusing, if not
conflicting, marital laws.8 5 For instance, the Muslim Marriage Act
82. The Child Marriage Restraint Act (CMRA)-also known as the Sharda Act-prohibited
child marriages of girls below the age of fifteen and of boys below the age of eighteen. Child
Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, No. 19, Act of Parliament, 1929 (India). It was amended in 1978
to increase the age of solemnization from fifteen and eighteen to eighteen and twenty-one for
girls and boys respectively. See The Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, 1978, No. 2,
Acts of Parliament (India); see also ASHA BAJPAI, CHILD RIGHTS IN INDIA: LAW, POLICY, AND
PRACTICE 220-21 (2003).
83. See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, No. 25, Acts of Parliament, 1955 (India).
84. Id. § 5.
85. See marriage laws cited supra notes 55-59.
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(MMA), also enacted in 1955, does not impose an age prohibition on
marriage. 86 Instead, it requires that both parties be Muslim in order
to qualify for marriage. 87 The MMA does not explain the prevailing
Hindu practice that celebrates child marriage. However, the MMA
and other competing marriage laws expose descriptive problems be-
tween various Indian marital laws, which pose normative challenges.
Thus, religion confuses India's marriage laws and practices. In fact,
the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board claims that "in family mat-
ters the country's Muslims should be subject only to Islamic law."' 88
That organization and those similar to it point to a 1937 act instanti-
ating Muslims' right to be governed by their own rule in India.89 That
Muslims comprise the largest minority population in India brings this
internecine conflict into sharp contrast. According to some Muslim
interpretations of Sharia, girls may marry as young as twelve years old
(even younger if they have experienced puberty).90 In an interview,
one former Muslim child bride voiced confusion over the legal conflict
between the federal rule requiring adulthood for marriage and the
MMA, advocating that "the sooner a girl gets married, the better."91
The bride's father-in-law explained the law's relevance: "Women are
like creeper plants that latch onto any tree they find-whether it's a
good tree or a bad tree. Once they get to puberty they are always in
danger of falling into bad ways."' 92
Subsequent to the HMA's ratification, successions of federal laws
were enacted to curb the incidence of child marriage, including the
Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act,93 and most recently, the
Prohibition of Child Marriage Act of 2006.94 Krishna Tirath, the Min-
ister of Women and Child Development, acknowledged that "despite
the law, child marriages continue[ ] to take place." 95 In a recent
UNICEF handbook meant to communicate the perils of underage
marriage, Minister Tirath noted, "There are many marriages in which
86. Muslim Marriage Act, 1957, No. 53, Acts of Parliament, 1957 (India).
87. Id. § 6.
88. Charles Haviland, Battle Over India's Marriage Age, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2002), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/2238321.stm.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, 1978, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1978
(India).
94. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, No. 6, Acts of Parliament, 2007 (India).
95. See MINISTRY OF WOMEN & CHILD DEVELOPMENT, HANDBOOK ON THE PROHIBITION OF
CHILD MARRIAGE Acr, 2006, at 3 (2006), available at http://www.unicef.org/india/ChildMar-
riage-handbook.pdf.
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both the girl and the boy are children. In others the girls are children/
minors who are married off to much older men, or sometimes even
sold into marriage. '96
B. The High Incidence of Underage Marriage
Child marriage is a deeply entrenched custom and phenomenon in
India. Over 40% of women between the ages of twenty and twenty-
four report that they married under the legal age of consent. 97 Impor-
tantly, this figure represents a decline in most states from 54% of In-
dian girls forced into underage marriages twenty years ago. 98 This
decline, however, could mask the severity of child marriage in India's
rural communities, where the externalities of child marriage range
from sexually transmitted diseases and teen pregnancy to domestic vi-
olence perpetrated both by husbands and mothers-in-law against
young brides.
Child marriage exposes an imbedded gender dynamic as well. Fam-
ilies marry sons under the legal age required by law, but such practices
are less common than girls forced into marriage. As a government
report noted, "Men in the same age group [as women] get married...
at a median age of 23.4 years. Sixteen percent of men aged 20-49 are
married by age 18 and [28%] by 20."99 Figure 3 provides a visual ac-
count of marriage trends in India. In 2007-2008, the most recent pe-
riod for which this federal data was collected, 42.9% of women
reported being wed under the legal age of consent.100
96. Id.
97. Interview with Jose Bergua, Chief of Child Protection for India, UNICEF, in Delhi, India
(Feb. 23, 2011).
98. Child Marriage, supra note 13.
99. INT'L INST. POPULATION Sci., NATIONAL FAMILY HEALTH SURVEY, at xxxi (2005-2006).
100. See INT'L INST. POPULATION Sci., DISTRICT LEVEL HOUSEHOLD AND FACILITY SURVEY
2007-08, at 17 tbl.2.7 (2010) [hereinafter DLHS], available at http://www.rchiips.org/pdf/INDIA_
REPORTDLHS-3.pdf. The same data indicates that the percentage of underage marriages in
rural areas is as high as 48%. See id.
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FIGURE 3: PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN AGES 20-24 MARRIED
BEFORE AGE 18, BY YEAR1 °1
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Indeed, the states with the highest rates of child marriage were
among those where field research for this project was conducted, in-
cluding Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. West Bengal, Rajasthan,
Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh share
the unfortunate distinction as the states wherein at least one in two
girls will marry before her eighteenth birthday, and many before the
age of ten or eleven to avoid puberty and ensure purity.10 2 Often,
these marriages are facilitated by "mass weddings" on special Hindu
holidays, such as Akha Teej. 103
A report by the BBC pointed to the scope of the problem: "On
auspicious days in the Hindu calendar it is not uncommon for
thousands of children, including babies, to be married, despite laws
already in place designed to prevent such practices. ' 10 4 These mar-
riages are not conducted as surreptitious ceremonies in covertly con-
cealed, clandestine locations. To the contrary, child marriage is a
conspicuous secret in full view of local authorities.
101. Child Marriage, supra note 13.
102. See id. at 1-2.
103. Akha Teej is an auspicious time of celebration in India, which is frequently celebrated by
marriage ceremonies. In recent years, law enforcement organizations in India target this holiday
as an opportunity to stop child marriages. See Alastair Lawson, Child Marriages Targeted in
India, BBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/southasia/1617759.stm.
104. Id.
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FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN AGES 20-24 MARRIED
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C. Pitfalls and Praxis: Trends in Child Marriage
A compelling piece of literature documented the pitfalls of child
marriages, particularly for developing nations. Not surprisingly, the
105. Child Marriage, supra note 13.
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highest rates of child marriage correlate with illiteracy and lack of ed-
ucational attainment.10 6 Noticeably then, high-literacy states such as
Kerala report among the lowest incidences of child marriage. 10 7
The District Level Household and Facility Survey (DLHS) provides
essential information to NGOs working on behalf of women's and
children's rights. The survey is one of the largest demographic and
health studies carried out in India. The first survey, administered by
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MHFW), was conducted
"in 1997 to provide district level estimates on health indicators to as-
sists [sic] policy makers and program administrators in decentralized
planning, monitoring and evaluation."'01 8 The organization is now on
its third national survey. The empirical data illuminate important de-
tails about the literacy of households, age of marriage, size of families,
and even prenatal care. In some ways it functions as a census on the
status of women in India. For this project, the DLHS helped to illus-
trate trends in education and knowledge about government health
programs, marriage, fertility, and other relevant issues.
Trends in child marriage follow key demographics, such as educa-
tion, habitation (rural versus urban), poverty, and caste. The DLHS
reported that although child marriages occur with high frequency
throughout India, a striking disparity is distilled by comparing rural
areas to their urban counterparts. 10 9 For instance, "[c]hild marriage
• . . affects girls in rural areas (48%) more than in urban regions
(29%)."110 Figure 4 further illustrates this point. Even within the
same geographical demographic, girls from scheduled castes, tribes,
and economically disenfranchised households generally marry at a
younger age.' The average age of marriage for a woman with at
least the equivalent of a high school diploma is roughly twenty-
three.1 12 By contrast, the highest age of marriage for women of the
lowest caste is about fifteen.' 1 3
106. Compare id., with Literacy Rate in India, MAPS OF INDIA, http://www.mapsofindia.com/
census20ll/literacy-rate.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
107. Child Marriage, supra note 13. In 2011, the female literacy rate was 91.98%. Kerala
Population Census Data 2011, POPULATION CENSUS INDIA, http://www.census20ll.co.in/census/
state/kerala.html.
108. See INT'L INST. POPULATION Sci., DISTRICT LEVEL HOUSEHOLD AND FACILITY SURVEY:
UTFAR PRADESH FACT SHEET 2 (2007-2008), available at http://www.fnchstar.org/pdf/whereWe
Work/DLHS3UPFactSheet.pdf.
109. See DLHS, supra note 100, at xxii.
110. Child Marriage, supra note 13.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Why have many Indian communities participated in practices that
ultimately deny educational attainment to girls? Why marry them
early? Chief among their considerations are financial constraints.
Families believe that facilitating an early marriage relieves them of
their daughter's economic burden,114 but this belief is grounded in two
key matters. First, in rural areas, parents are less likely to educate
their daughters, thereby limiting their daughters' practical skills. Sec-
ond, because their daughters lack both practical and more advanced
skills that can generally only be obtained with an education, a perni-
cious cycle is born. Moreover, if an education is not afforded to a girl
prior to exiting her parents' home, one will not be afforded to her
while living with her in-laws.
1. Child Marriage and Education
The pitfalls of underage marriage include educational deprivation.
Families perceive investing in girls' education to be an inappropriate
use of resources or a "waste."'1 15 A commonly voiced concern during
my interviews was that "a girl's education will only benefit her hus-
band's household, and not the family of origin. 11 6 This perception,
coupled with educational deprivation, harms not only young women,
but their families, the state, and India. Still, rural families remain re-
luctant to educate their daughters for various reasons. In dangerous
districts, for example, parents confided their fears to me, including re-
luctance to allow their daughters to walk or bicycle alone to school,
concerned that the girls might be verbally assaulted, physically
abused, sexually coerced, or raped. 117
Measuring the depth and legitimacy of these concerns is not easy to
do, especially as the dangers of sexual violence and exploitation in
some rural communities inure a palpable threat, both real and appar-
ent.118 In other words, although girls are the victims of "tradition" in
restricting their access to schooling, their parents' concerns about sex-
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id.
116. See Child Marriage, supra note 13, at 2.
117. Interview with community women, in Bihar, India and Bikramganj, India (Feb. 18-19,
2012); Interview with Jose Bergua, supra note 97. Recently reported gang rapes of adult female
students in India lend further credibility to parents' concerns. See Jason Burke, Indian Police
Investigate Two Gang Rape Cases, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2013/jan/13/indian-police-investigate-gang-rape.
118. See MINISTRY OF WOMEN & CHILD DEVELOPMENT, supra note 95, at 6. The Ministry
observed:
Parents justify early marriage as a way to protect the girl child from violence. How-
ever, parents do not understand that child marriage actually opens the door to an end-
less and vicious cycle of domestic violence and abuse. Marriage is also often used as
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ual violence deserves state attention. In the months since my stay in
Bihar, a brutal gang rape of a woman who exited a train in Bihar has
captured international attention; the victim was sexually assaulted and
murdered by a group of men.11 9
Several weeks prior to the January 11, 2013 gang rape and murder
in Bihar, on December 16, 2012, a medical student's brutal gang rape
and murder on a bus in Delhi, the nation's capital, also captured inter-
national attention. 120 That case epitomizes India's hopes and fears re-
garding women; the female medical student defied traditional norms
(and low expectations) that purport women to lack the requisite intel-
lectual capacities to succeed at graduate study, and yet even her status
could not overcome a more general vulnerability of women in India to
widespread violence.' 2l In fact, the local government in Delhi re-
cently reported hiring hundreds of guards to post outside of over 500
elementary schools, because parents reported their daughters being
stalked, harassed, and sexually violated after school by men who wait
outside the schools and follow girls home. 122 Manish Gupta, Commis-
sioner of South Delhi Municipal Corporation, which oversees Delhi's
elementary schools, explained in a news report, "We have planned to
deploy private security guards, from government-approved agencies,
in primary schools by the next academic year after several cases of
molestation came to our notice .... We are taking this step in order to
draw the girl students back to school. ' 123 Generally, reported cases of
rape have increased by 20% between 2007 and 2011,124 and those
cases involving school-aged girls and college students have become
more visible in recent years. 125 Importantly, some parents view
the first step to trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation, forced labour or any
other purpose.
Id.
119. See Burke, supra note 117.
120. See Delhi Gang Rape Victim's Funeral Held, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-asia-india-20869185 (last updated Dec. 30, 2012, 3:54 PM).
121. See Annie Banerji, In Indian Student's Gang Rape, Murder, Two Worlds Collide,
REUTERS, Dec. 31, 2012, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/212/121311uk-india-rape-at-
tack-idUKBRE8BU02A20121231.
122. Delhi Primary Schools to Hire Guards for Girls' Security, NDTV, http://www.ndtv.com/
article/cities/delhi-primary-schools-to-hire-guards-for-girls-security-303147 (last updated Dec. 9,
2012).
123. Id.
124. Olga Khazan, How India's Rape Name-and-Shame Database Could Backfire, WASH.
POST (Dec. 28, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.comfblogs/worldviews/wp/2012/12/
28/how-indias-rape-name-and-shame-database-could-backfire. The increased incidence of rape
could be a manifestation of better reporting mechanisms and women feeling more courageous to
report sex abuse. On the other hand, there could genuinely be an increase in rape.
125. See id.; Burke, supra note 117.
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schools as a dangerous place for their daughters and justify restricting
school as a means of keeping their girls safe.126 The result, however, is
that nearly 70% of women in some rural communities are illiterate
when they marry. 127
Two interesting points of contrast can be illumed from this data: (1)
the incredibly low percentage of women in rural marriages as com-
pared to women in urban marriages with a high school diploma
equivalent-less than 7% 128-and (2) the sharp disparity between ed-
ucational attainment for women in urban versus rural areas.1 29 The
data did not paint a panacea in urban areas, but the contrasts are
nonetheless striking between the urban areas and rural communities.
In Jharkhand, nearly 70% of rural married women were illiterate,
while this figure was fewer than 30% in the district's urban reaches. 130
In fact, over 40% of married women in the urban community's popu-
lation have ten or more years of education.131
Importantly, if girls are denied the opportunity for education, the
gap is filled by something else. NGOs point to compelled childbear-
ing and isolation as the consequences of denying girls education. In-
deed, if previously enrolled, child brides are often forced to drop out
of school to work for their in-laws.1 32 According to UNICEF, when
child brides leave school, they are "exposed to higher risk of domestic
violence and abuse, increased economic dependence, denial of deci-
sion-making power, [and] inequality at home, which further perpetu-
ates discrimination and low status of girls/women.1' 33
2. Child Marriage and Health
Child marriage is also associated with significant health risks and
consequences for adolescent and barely pubescent girls. Early mar-
riage typically results in repeated pregnancies. These pregnancies
126. See Delhi Primary Schools to Hire Guards for Girls' Security, supra note 122.
127. JHARKHAND FACr SHEET, supra note 77 (noting that, in 2007-2008, 68.2% of married
women from ages fifteen to forty-four in rural Jharkhand were illiterate); see also DLHS, supra
note 100, at 32 tbl.3.1. Note also in Bihar:
* 39% of all women are allowed to go by themselves to the market;
* 36% are allowed to go by themselves to a health facility;
* 30% have freedom to travel outside their own village or community by themselves;
* 25% of women are allowed to go alone to all three of these places.
INT'L INST. POPULATION Sci., NATIONAL FAMILY HEALTH SURVEY INDIA 2005-06: BIHAR 25
(2008), available at http://www.rchiips.org[NFHSINFHS-3%2OData/Bihar-report.pdf.
128. DLHS, supra note 100, at 34.
129. Id.
130. JHARKHAND FACT SHEET, supra note 77.
131. Id.
132. See Child Marriage, supra note 13, at 2.
133. Id. at 1.
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tend to occur before full physical maturation, thereby causing signifi-
cant complications. For example, 66.6% of girls between the ages of
fifteen and nineteen experience childbirth complications, compared to
59.7% of women between the ages of thirty and thirty-four. 134 They
are also more likely to experience neonatal complications and high
infant and child mortality rates. The graph below illumes some of the
child-bearing-related health challenges posed by underage marriage.
FIGURE 5: CHILD MORTALITY RATES BY AGE OF
MOTHER IN 2005-2006135
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Consequently, not only are underage wives worse off because they
lack education, but they are also exposed to more health harms. Fig-
ure 5 indicates that the children of women who marry underage are
also worse off. "For instance, for young children under the age of
[five] years, the risk of malnutrition (stunting and underweight) is
higher in children born to young mothers . than in those born to
women married after the legal age. '' 136
Physical health harms extend to threats of violence. For example,
girls forced into underage marriages are more likely to be victimized
in the household. Consider the following:
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id.
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Often [ill-equipped] and under-valued, adolescent girls married
early are at risk of experiencing domestic violence. NFHS 3 data
shows [sic] 56% of women age 15-49 in Bihar have experienced
physical or sexual violence. It is also a [well-known] fact that young
brides are subjected to much abuse because of their inability to
cook properly, refusal to have sexual intercourse and inability to
work copious amounts. More than half the women (57%) in the age
group 15-19 believed that a husband was justified in hitting his wife
137
Physical abuse such as that described above may be initiated by young
brides' mothers-in-law as well as the husbands. In my interviews, it
became very clear that the function of new brides was to clean and
serve their in-laws, especially their mothers-in-law who become the
"haves" while brides become the "have-nots."
IV. A PERSISTENT PROBLEM DESPITE LEGISLATIVE ACTION
When studying underage marriage in India, it becomes clear that
multiple layers of complicity overlap. Parents violate federal law to
marry their daughters to the best situated grooms. Matchmakers facil-
itate the connections between grooms (and parents) and the brides'
families. 138 Such practices also extend to the United States.139 Judges
certify the marriages in violation of the HMA and the Prohibition of
Child Marriage Act. Given the enactment of federal laws prohibiting
underage marriage, combined with the negative impacts of the prac-
tice, particularly on women, why does it persist? Why is child mar-
riage still rampant in India? Is there a doctrinal account or theory
that can rationalize this practice?
On one hand, the frequency of rule making in India demonstrates a
confidence that governmental rule making can foster change, at least
among legislators. It also points to legislators recognizing the depth
and externalities of the nation's child-marriage market. Additionally,
legislative action and formal law reflect agreement, collaboration, and
mutuality or shared opinion on a critical set of issues. In this case, the
dangers of child marriage are apparent at the federal legislative level.
137. UNICEF, supra note 73, at 92-93.
138. See Susan Donaldson James, Wife Sues In-Laws, Says Arranged Marriage Turned to Slav-
ery, ABC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wife-sues-laws-alleging-arranged-
marriage-turned-human/story?id=15342407&singlePage=true#.T4xWjdXBWF8 (reporting on
the lawsuit brought by Diptiben Mistry, who sued her parents-in-law, Chandrakant and Nilam
Udwadia, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma for keeping her as a
"virtual prisoner"). In fact, arranged-marriage brides may generally know little about their pro-
spective grooms and future parents-in-law; they are generally removed from these processes
even in the most sophisticated and highly educated families. See id.
139. Id.
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With this in mind, legislators should be commended for advancing
anti-child marriage legislation and platforms.
On the other hand, when the crude practice of child marriage per-
sists despite multiple layers of laws condemning, prohibiting, and pe-
nalizing the practice, a crisis in the rule of law is at hand. It is a sign of
institutional failure. In other words, that child marriage not only per-
sists, but is a rampant feature of national life, exposes key weaknesses
in India's rule of law. What explains it? ,
The Indian government has demonstrated a commitment to ratify-
ing and enacting laws to protect children. The Indian Constitution
guarantees basic rights to all children regardless of socioeconomic sta-
tus, cultural affiliation, and "geo-political" situation.140 For example,
the Indian government enacted the National Plan of Action for Chil-
dren in 2005 and the Ministry of Women and Child Development
aimed to "eliminate child marriages by 2010. ' 141 Internationally, "In-
dia is signatory to several international human rights instruments that
protect children from all forms of abuse and exploitation and ensure
them the right to dignity and childhood,' 142 including the U.N. Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), 143 Convention on Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),144
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ESCR).145 This rule making reveals a commitment to the
rights of children. But it may also illume a commitment to rule mak-
ing. In other words, it may be that the rule-making process serves
governmental interests and not outcomes-outcomes may be secon-
dary to a national or federal interest in simply enacting rules.
.Although child marriage is the example deployed here, India's civil
rights laws "protecting" women provide an equally compelling exam-
ple. Indeed, Indian legislative protections for women may be among
some of the more nuanced and progressive laws enacted anywhere in
the world to prohibit domestic violence, 146 sexual harassment, 147
dowry, 148 the indecent representation of women, 14 9 and the immoral
140. MINISTRY OF WOMEN & CHILD DEVELOPMENT, supra note 95, at 7.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
144. United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
145. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
146. See The Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, No. 43, Acts of Parlia-
ment, 2005 (India).
147. The Protection of Women Against Sexual Harassment at Workplace Bill, 2007 (India).
148. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, No. 28, Acts of Parliament, 1961 (India).
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trafficking of persons. 150 Yet the National Crime Records Bureau
provides a chilling account of harms against women in India that
range from the rarer but extreme and barbaric acid throwing, to ram-
pant sexual assault, marital rape, and domestic violence. Such violent
acts against women occur frequently in spite of law.
One way to explain this phenomenon, in which law does not lead to
social change or to social justice for the most vulnerable in society, is
suggested by Marc Galanter, that is, the "haves" really do come out
ahead. In this way, we can imagine that given India's deeply en-
trenched gender problems, and subordination of women in work and
home, men will always come out ahead. This, then, could explain the
two stories of pro-women's rights laws failing to protect women and
anti-child marriage laws succumbing along the same lines. Though it
may be compelling, this is an incomplete explanation-a half-painted
portrait.
A. Crying Wolf
The failure of India's laws to effect actual change may point to the
"overuse" of legislation. In other words, too much legislation may
produce an anesthetizing or numbing effect. Here, marriage legisla-
tion may be perceived as crying wolf to disinterested, disenchanted,
and disbelieving citizens. Accordingly, the legislature has lost its cred-
ibility, much like the boy who cried wolf. Frequent legislation on child
marriage without enforcement likely produces an effect similar to that
which juries experience upon learning that a plaintiff is a repeat per-
sonal injury litigant. 151
Interestingly, when legislatures fail to implement the appropriate
enforcement mechanisms, not only do such efforts produce a perverse
effect-the trouncing of new law-but they may also inadvertently
cause those whom the law was intended to protect to lose confidence
in the legislative process. As a consequence, the law fails to bring
about or produce the legislatively intended effect.
Crying wolf at the federal legislative level may shape local govern-
ment perceptions about the capacity of the central legislative process
to bring about social change. This becomes particularly relevant for
the judges and law enforcement officers who are responsible for inter-
149. The Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986, No. 60, Acts of Parlia-
ment, 1986 (India).
150. The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, No. 104, Acts of
Parliament, 1956 (India).
151. See generally Galanter, supra note 1 (studying the outcomes of repeat players in
litigation).
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preting and implementing law. The danger in repeat legislation is that
it eventually functions as symbolic rather than substantive.
B. Local over Central
India's challenge in overcoming a legacy of child marriage can also
be explained by custom trumping federal law. Frequently, during in-
terviews in India, government officials, NGO leaders and activists,
and citizens reminded me that custom is as important, if not more so,
than federal law. This perception helps to explain the blatant disre-
gard for federal prohibitions on child marriage.
Dowry has figured significantly in Indian customs that predate legis-
lative action to tamp down on child marriage, thus families are moti-
vated to play the dowry market successfully. In other words, the
dowry practice may perpetuate child marriage because it encourages
parents to "sell off" their daughters earlier than later, figuring that the
older and more educated young women become, the more difficult it
will be to secure marriages. More educated girls generally demand a
more significant dowry. The perverse consequences of dowry include
early marriage and suppressing education to gamble that a daughter
will be married and not "over-priced" for the marriage market.
Dowry is proscribed by the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, but the
practice is a widespread "evil," according to a Bihar judicial
magistrate. 152
C. A Gendered Economic Problem
Child marriage in India also reveals a deeply entrenched gender
problem. According to one commentator, "The sad fact is that in In-
dia, . . . a cocktail of female infanticide, dowry deaths, trafficking and
domestic violence creates a toxic environment for women (the world's
fourth most dangerous country for women.., according to Thompson
Reuters foundation).' 1 53 This gender problem touches on both edu-
cation and marriage. Jose Bergua, the Chief UNICEF Officer in
charge of matters relating to children, reiterated a theme commonly
heard throughout India: "Girls are perceived as an economic burden"
unlike boys who are perceived as a family's investment. 54 Indeed, the
perception that girls are property, or "paraya dhan," belonging to the
marital family reinforces the urgency to marry girls as quickly as possi-
152. Interview with Komal Ram, supra note 66.
153. Jen Swanson, Indian Girls Are Married Off to Avoid Becoming Prostitutes, SLATE (Apr.
2, 2012, 1:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/articIes/double-x/doublex/2012/04/indian-girls-become_
childbrides insteadof._prostitutes_.html.
154. Interview with Jose Bergua, supra note 97.
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ble. By marrying girls at the youngest age possible, a family reduces
the investment costs in their daughters.
Families' concerns about investing in girls are further demonstrated
by the reluctance to educate daughters. Again, "[i]nvesting in girls'
education is not considered worthy," as girls move to the groom's
household and are employed in fulfilling his family's chores. 15 5 Be-
cause girls suffer the fate of illiteracy, which ultimately deprives them
of non-menial work opportunities, marriage becomes one of the few
options for young women.
Finally, weddings are a lavish expression of cultural norms in India.
Sonia Gandhi, a leader in India's Congress, recently spoke out against
the "ostentatious" shows of wealth that commonly accompany Indian
marriages.' 56 Even the very poor cannot escape it. Parents attempt to
marry daughters early and in group weddings to reduce costs. 1 57
Some families will even try to marry all the daughters at the same
ceremony to limit expenses. 158 According to UNICEF, poor families
even combine weddings with funerals to defray costs.' 59
D. Reducing the Incidence of Prostitution
The prevalence of children trafficked into prostitution is a hidden
secret in India. Some families and community leaders regard early
marriage as a less offensive and safer alternative to the sexual trade.
In a world of less-than-ideal options, child marriage is often perceived
as the lesser of compromised or burdened options. Mittal Patel, Sec-
retary of Vicharta Samuday Samarthan Manch, an Ahmedabad-based
NGO, framed it as follows: "If a daughter is not engaged or married
by the time she's [ten] years old, she'll be pushed into the flesh
trade."'160 One commentator noted, "Often it's the mothers who did
the pushing, as the families were desperate for some income.' 161
Prostitution follows a similar dynamic to that of child marriage; the
younger the girl, the better likelihood that she will be picked. Families
that choose to prostitute their daughters, rather than marry them off,
begin the process early in the developmental lifecycle of a girl-gener-
ally about the age of ten.
155. See Child Marriage, supra note 13, at 2.
156. See India Looks to Cut Food Wastage at Weddings, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Mar. 22, 2011),
at 16, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/8398383/India-consid-
ers-introducing-law-restricting-wasted-wedding-food.html.
157. Child Marriage, supra note 13, at 2.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Swanson, supra note 153.
161. Id.
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E. Enforcement
India's child marriage problem exists in part because of a failure of
government. At its most obvious, the failure of government is a fail-
ure of enforcement. In other words, were efforts to secure the prom-
ise of its laws in place and enforcement mechanisms launched, the
threat of criminal sanctions might reduce child marriages. Here, how-
ever, I mean to suggest that something more basic and yet more fun-
damentally flawed is occurring. That is, the government's governing
process is compromised by an inability to enforce its legislation and by
an incapacity to delegate resources and human capital to address child
marriage. This inability does not appear to be an economic obstacle-
although that might be a reasonable explanation. For now, it is an
empirical question. Were enforcement measures against child mar-
riage more rigorously pursued, states might better calculate the costs
(human, economic, and political) of saving children from the grasps of
child marriage.
V. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE PERVERSION
OF JUSTICE
India's rural villages are mired in hopelessness. These are not the
bucolic spaces romanticized by terms like country, rustic, or pastoral,
especially when juxtaposed to "urban." These are not sleepy districts
where doors never close in the evenings and locks never turn to secure
a latch. To the contrary, some of India's most notorious child mar-
riage districts are rife with illiteracy, poverty, violence, prostitution,
kidnapping, and other forms of petty and more organized crime. The
lawlessness in Bihar, for example, significantly exceeds the gang war-
fare of the most notorious U.S. cities. 162
It is against this backdrop that judges determine their level of in-
vestment in upholding federal law, how much they will tolerate cus-
tom that conflicts with federal law, and what roles (and personal
investment) they will provide in these districts (from which they will
rotate in a matter of a few years). Thus, judges present one of the
more significant barriers to law flourishing in rural Indian communi-
ties. Participating in child marriages contradicts their roles and duties
in guarding against child marriage and protecting the interests of chil-
dren. Compromised, then, is not only the perception of the bench as a
source and fount of justice, but also the human rights of children
forced into marriages with adults.
162. Cf. Tewary, supra note 78.
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In Bikramgranj, judges informed me that they felt helpless. 163 They
perceived nothing in their power that could change the conditions into
which the rural children were born. 164 The children's lives were a fait
accompli. Stopping a sixteen-year-old girl from marrying a second
husband because the first died would not, in their minds, enhance the
girl's life prospects. 165
In other words, judges have lacked confidence in the power of law
to significantly better the conditions into which children in poverty are
born, including those in the districts where they served. And they
have lost their discernment or ethical compass. One judge explained
child marriage as a condition of being from a low caste, and therefore
nothing that law could change.' 66
Judges are essential to the practice of interpreting and implement-
ing law. Yet, in rural India, their perceptions and behaviors as inter-
preters of law beg the question of whether providing girls with more
law reduces inequality or creates the pathways for equal opportunity
and status enhancement. Or is it, as Thomas Carothers suggested,
that "Western policy makers and commentators have seized on the
rule of law as an elixir for countries in transition"? 67 It is likely both.
Balakrishnan Rajagopal argued that the enthusiastic embrace of the
rule of law by human rights activists and others is motivated by "a
desire to escape from politics by imagining the rule of law as technical,
legal, and apolitical." 168
Child marriage in India exposes law's competing and sometimes
collaborating forces, such as custom or tradition, religion, poverty,
corruption, war, sexism, racism, caste, and tribal conflict. Any one of
these elements can undercut the sturdiness and durability of "good"
law. In cooperation, these competing forces can and will derail law.
Adherence to custom, corruption among judges, sexism, and poverty
undercut decades of efforts to effectively implement legislation on be-
half of children.
India is at a crossroads where creating more law will neither enable
the rule of law to flourish nor create the conditions under which mini-
mal inroads can be established. If judges are essential to the promo-
tion of justice, the mediation of peace, and the reduction of harms, but
163. Group Interview in Judicial Chambers, in Bihar, India (Feb. 19, 2011).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Interview with Komal Ram, supra note 66.
167. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 95, 99.
168. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Rebuilding: A Critical
Examination, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2008).
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abrogate those responsibilities in the communities of the vulnerable,
then the rule of law suffers a staggering, almost unrecoverable blow.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article unpacks one key aspect of the rule of law in India.
Child marriage in India persists as a national challenge despite the
rule of law. For decades, federal law in India has consistently barred
underage marriages. Yet, despite numerous laws and aggressive pub-
lic statements, the rule of law has been ineffective in curbing this so-
cially dominant practice. Further, despite the legal and social
challenges associated with child marriage, including severe health ef-
fects (such as maternal and child morbidity, venereal diseases, and
HIV), domestic violence, malnutrition, and poverty that traps child
brides, federal authorities have made limited progress in stopping the
practice. Upon inspection, what becomes clear is that custom fre-
quently trumps federal law-often with the complicity or intentional
blindness of key governmental actors, such as judges.
As this Article articulates, the rule of law cannot be evaluated in a
vacuum isolated from political, cultural, and social contexts. When
studied up close, child marriage provides a compelling lens through
which to evaluate the effectiveness and capacity of governmental insti-
tutions to uphold the rule of law or to make the rule of law meaning-
ful. In isolation, India's rule of law regime regarding child marriage
strikes a powerful blow against the exploitation of children. On the
ground, however, fundamental weaknesses are revealed, exposing the
law's impotence when enforcement mechanisms are lacking.
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